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TICOM I-42

REPORT ON FOURTH INTERROGATION OF OBERSTLTN. FRIEDRICH (Head of OKL/GEN.NAFUE. 3. ABT) at A.D.I.K., 11/7/45, 4 P.M., incorporating statements made by Major OELJESCHLAEGER (recently in Gen.Nafue. 3 Abt.) and by General MARTINI (Gen.Nafue. of OKL.)
(NB. Oeljeschlaeger seen on 11/7, 2 P.M., and on 15/7, A.M.; Martini seen on 15/7, A.M., at A.D.I.K.)

All questions were based on items in the War Diary of OKL/GEN.NAFUE. 3 Abt.

Interrogator: F.P. Pickering.

TICOM
18 July 1945

No. of pages 4

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The purpose of the visit to A.D.I.K. on 11/7 was to obtain from Oberstltn. FRIEDRICH clarification of certain points in the War Diary of Gen.Nafue. 3 Abt., one volume of which is summarised in TICOM/D-4. Not all were satisfactorily answered.

Interrogator had, earlier on 11/7, already seen Major OELJESCHLAEGER, who had signed a few of the items in the diary. OELJESCHLAEGER answered questions affecting these, and some others. (A separate report will appear on this P/W.)

Interrogator was on 15/7/45 able to put some of the same questions to General MARTINI, got two useful answers and, for the rest, drew blanks. General MARTINI has no detailed knowledge of FRIEDRICH's work.

This paper is, in the main, therefore an annotation of TICOM/D-4. One of FRIEDRICH's more interesting digressions is reported in section 12.

Details

1. The Germans prepare to counter Allied V-weapons.

Order No.8249/44 of 14/7/44, signed General MARTINI, found in a volume of the 3 Abt. War Diary (volume now with ADI. Science), and various orders of December '44 and one of Feb. '45, require the GAF. Sigint service to investigate possible counter-measures in the event of Allied use of V1-type and V2-type weapons. At the request of ADI. Science, interrogator asked what was the origin of the scare.

FRIEDRICH states that the order came down to him from above. He tried himself to establish the origin of the rumour that the Allies were preparing to use such weapons.

It seems that at some conference, about the time when the V1 attack had just been launched, attention was drawn to an article in a Spanish, or Portugese, newspaper (or it may have been a scientific journal) describing work by the Allies on a piece of high-frequency equipment combining: a receiver coupled with an oscillograph and linked with a D/F mechanism and a jammer. FRIEDRICH was unable to give further details; he had orders to investigate methods of plotting and jamming V-type weapons, and handed the matter over to his experts. (The statements in the War Diary dealing with equipment available, equipment required, etc. are being examined by ADI. Science.) FRIEDRICH says there was never any wireless actibity which could be associated with Allied V-weapon trials or experiments.

[General MARTINI, who signed the original order of 14/7/44, was asked on 15/7/45 to give his version. NB. MARTINI and FRIEDRICH have no contact.

He says he was present at a conference summoned when the V-campaign was to be launched. It was put to the meeting that the Allies would presumably retaliate in kind, if they were prepared; the possibility of jamming, or at least of plotting, Allied V-weapons should be examined by experts. There was, moreover, "a story that the Allies were preparing to bombard Europe with rocket missiles from North AFRICA." MARTINI could not give further details.]

2. GAF Sigint and the plotting of German V-weapons.

Order No.80545/45 of 8/3/45 (see TICOM/D-4, p.2, 3b) required LN. Rgt. 351 to coöperate with AKzV (the V-2 launchers). FRIEDRICH explained that this was again merely in fulfilment of orders from above. AKzV wanted the coöperation and applied for it; FRIEDRICH passed the order on to the Western Sigint Regiment 351. He is almost certain that his people were to help Oberst RANDEWIG's signals unit to plot V-2 flights, supplementing RANDEWIG's efforts by exploiting Allied signals arising from the launchings. (Another document shows that FRIEDRICH's people used to plot V-1 flights by monitoring our Fighter R/T.)

3. LN Rgts. 180, 181, 182 etc. (see TICOM/D-4, p.1, A1)
These Regimental numberings were never official. OKL Gen.QU first allotted, then withdrew the numbers: it was discovered that the 180 series had been booked for some other type of signals unit.

4. Last moves of GAF Sigint. units (see TICOM/D-4, p.1, A2).
Please alter the Note in TICOM/D-4 p.2 top paragraph. For "probably not implemented" read: this applied to Referats A and D which were not included in the move to PREMSTAETTEN.

5. Emergency cover (see TICOM/D-4, p.2, Section 4).
F. IEDRICH could not relate these cover assignments to specific German apprehensions. "Such orders were always being sent."

6. Eastern Front "Lagefunk". (See TICOM/D-4, p.2, Section 5.)
FRIEDRICH states that a "Lagefunk" (running commentary) presupposes centralised evaluation. Whereas in the Western Regiment there was, in addition to the Evaluation Companies of the Abteilungen, a Regimental Evaluation Company (25/351) and a well-developed system of Report Centres; in the East evaluation was regional and there was no Regimental Evaluation Company. It was not until retreats had brought the Germans into the relatively narrow areas held in February and March 1945 that regional running commentaries were deemed practical, and, in view of the Russian air menace to the home area, necessary.

7. Forecasting of Allied raids (see TICOM/D-4, p.3, 2nd para.)
FRIEDRICH was very amusing on this topic. His digs are directed at Jagdkorps II. FRIEDRICH had repeatedly to object to efforts to make scapegoats of his Sigint units for fighters' failures. Sigint gave the warnings: it was not up to Sigint to "get the windmills airborne."
FRIEDRICH said he had never seen U.S. bombers flying in formation. But day after day his units had reported "there goes the met. a/c, business today." "Now they're starting up the merry-go-round."

8. U.S. teletype traffics (see TICOM/I 13 and 29 and TICOM/D-4, p.3 Section B2, p.4 Section 7 and p.5 section 11).
FRIEDRICH was delighted when interrogator recalled the unit at BERLIN-SCHOENFELD covering 'FF 5' and 'FF 6'. "Those were the people I was trying to tell you about; those were the traffics I told you we were not able to break into. I was informed of a considerable increase in the mount of traffic being passed by the links and asked for increased effort to break into them." He tried to recall the name of the receiver the Germans were using. Interrogator said the German receiver was referred to in the War Diary as "FF 5-receiver", there seemed to be no special German name. FRIEDRICH says there is a special name. The receivers were provided by Wapruef 7.

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Comments: Interrogator has now elicited several statements from FRIEDRICH on this subject. All are consonant with the first, voluntary statement claiming that whereas the Germans had previously read US (what has been identified as undulator, see TICOM/I-29), they had been able to take down, but not break into the more advanced system 'which succeeded it'. Interrogator had, earlier in the day, asked Major Oeljeschlaeger (who was up to March '45 a member of FRIEDRICH's staff) about the Berlin-Schoenfeld party. He knew of its task but did not know for certain whether it had been reading any FF 5 and FF 6 traffic or not.

9. Cover of the Airforce of the Polish resistance Movement (see TICOM/D-4, p. 4, section 5)
FRIEDRICH was extremely annoyed. He knew nothing of the item. He didn't know the Polish resistance movement had an Air Force. As for

documents signed Oeljeschlaeger being filed in the War Diary . . . (amusing, but unprintable.)

10. RAF aware of GAF Sigint methods. (see TICOM/D-4, p.5, section 9)

Interrogator went, on 11/7/45, armed, not with the original document, but only with notes. FRIEDRICH was extremely puzzled by the phrase "Through circumstances known to you", which interrogator rendered by "durch bekannte Umstaende". He said such a vague phrase would not occur in orders. Interrogator had to promise to check the original. On Sunday, 15/7/45 interrogator decided to place the original order before General MARTINI, who had signed it, rather than before FRIEDRICH in whose diary it was found. General MARTINI read it carefully and said, without hesitation: "We lost a number of Sigint. personnel at the time of the Normandy breakthrough. There was a suspicion of desertions also. We recognised an almost immediate improvement in RAF signals and decided to accept this as proof that our fears were well-founded". [NB. FRIEDRICH and MARTINI have no contact.]

11. Prediction of Soviet Long Range Bomber incursions. (see TICOM/D-4, p.5, section 13)

During the session with Oeljeschlaeger on 15/7 interrogator mentioned in passing the Russian practice of allotting a frequency to each aircraft. P/W reacted violently with 'call-sign, not frequency'. (The War Diary entry nevertheless says 'frequency'). Oeljeschlaeger went on to say that a number of frequencies were used during each raid, but not one per aircraft; the frequencies could only be found by search. This statement was made with complete confidence and sounds more probable than the Diary entry.

12. Sigint without cryptanalysis.

This was a digression arising out of the subject of paragraph 10. FRIEDRICH presumably thought the question was put because we suspected the Germans had read some Allied Signals. He began very circumspectly. (He finds it difficult, having been on the losing side, to enlarge unduly on the advanced conception of Sigint. at which he has arrived). This war has proved that Sigint. cannot rely on cryptanalysis, but must make its own way. (FRIEDRICH had previously said that he had 'had nothing from his cryptanalysts since 1942', TICOM/I-13). He had always found VOEGELE, his chief Western cryptanalyst, difficult: VOEGELE would not see this point. Sigint. must study all radio manifestations, not merely signals. FRIEDRICH fears that we have not progressed beyond the stage reached by VOEGELE.

Nothing delighted FRIEDRICH more than the introduction of the ciphony device in fighter R/T. A Sigint. service relying on the contents of signals would have received a set-back. His Sigint. methods were not one whit damaged; in fact the efficiency of his plotting service improved. No immediate benefit is to be derived from contents of reasonably disciplined R/T traffics and only little can be gained from study of them when raids are over.

Comments: FRIEDRICH overstates his case. (1) he was eager that increased attention should be given to the interception of teletype traffics (see above). He evidently means that it is fatal to wait for cryptanalytic success. (2) He is not quite consistent on the subject of R/T. Questions put by other interrogators (reports not yet published) show that he was generally against jamming R/T. This suggests he preferred to listen to it, if he could.